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“COMMUNIST POLICE!” THE STATE IN THE 1970s TURKEY

The main characteristic of the 1970s was the division of the state apparatus in terms of political polarization. This was obvious, exactly, from the period of the first Nationalist Front government. From this era on, state officers no longer felt bound to the *raison d'etat* of the state, namely being impartial in their practices. Thus, the cadres of the state apparatus were divided into their ideological and political camps and in the end, the state was split.<sup>1</sup> Two main factors affected the process of the division of the state apparatus. The first was the appointment to ministry posts of members of the Nationalist Action Party and the National Salvation Party. These appointments had the aim of occupying the positions that were seen as strategic by these parties. As a result, these appointed officers were not bound to the hierarchy of the state but to the hierarchy of their parties.<sup>2</sup> The second factor was the effect of the ongoing political polarization to the state cadres naturally. This factor produced the same result: "the officer did not listen to his chief but to the political authority to which he was bound. The mechanism worked in this way from the postmen who worked in the PTT (Postal Service) to the customs officials, the police officers and the judges."<sup>3</sup>

The division of the state apparatus is among the most important factors to be considered in the evaluation of the Kahramanmaraş Incidents. The state apparatus as a whole, from its ideological apparatus (the teachers and other officers who worked in the National Education system) to its coercive apparatus (the soldiers and the police officers), and even the officers working in the infrastructural areas (such as the personnel of the Road Water Electricity Organization [*Yol Su Elektrik Teşkilatı*], Directorate of Forestry [*Orman Müdürlüğü*], and Postal Service [*PTT*], were at the heart of this event, not as the professionals of the state duties, but as the competing sides of the warfare in the Kahramanmaraş streets. Thus, not only the personnel of these institutions, but also the institutions themselves are at the center of the discussions about what actually happened in Maraş.

In order to understand the role of the state in the Kahramanmaraş Incidents, the historical context of the period defined by the establishment of the Republican People's Party government headed by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit must be remembered. The RPP government meant a certain relaxation for the leftist officers who had been under heavy pressure during the period of the Nationalist Front governments. The most powerful leftist employee organizations, namely the the Association of All Teachers Unity and Solidarity (*Tüm Öğretmenler Birleşme ve Dayanışma Derneği*, TÖB-DER) and the Police Association (*Polis Derneği*, POL-DER) regained the possibility of reorganizing in a much more comfortable atmosphere. In addition, the appointments made by the RPP weakened the rightist establishment and gave the leftist civil servants an extra advantage. This new process for the leftist civil servants affected the regions that saw political warfare in

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an extraordinary way as the sectarian division among the Alevi and Sunni communities was due to the disadvantageous position of the Alevi and leftist civil servants in these regions. In Kahramanmaraş, the RPP supporters of Alevi origin and radical leftists began to take over the posts of the rightist civil servants.<sup>4</sup>

The reaction to the leftist civil servants' organizations can be regarded as the first move of the rightist opposition against the RPP government. The RPP was accused by the three main political parties, who drew their support from the Sunni majority of central and eastern Anatolia, namely the National Salvation Party, the Nationalist Action Party and the Justice Party, of welcoming the communists and Alevis, who were organized in TÖB-DER, POL-DER and some other unions. Many examples can be found in the rightist press showing the reactions of each of these three parties. For example, the columnist of the NSP's newspaper *Milli Gazete* (National Newspaper), Mansur Moğol, argued that the existing government (RPP) "was guided by the gossip and the politics of TÖB-DER and POL-DER and surrendered to them."<sup>5</sup> The NSP's criticism was not restricted to the TÖB-DER and POL-DER. For instance, *Milli Gazete* criticized the Institute for Mineral Scrutiny and Search (*Maden Tetkik Arama Enstitüsü*) for sending five buses filled with the institution's employees to attend the funeral of the victims of the Bahçelievler Massacre with. It was noted that this action, which had been organized by Professor Nezihi Canitez (president of the MTA) had evoked reactions in the public.<sup>6</sup>

The most severe critic of the leftist employees' organizations was the NAP. The NAP's periodical, *Devlet* (State), claimed that the state apparatus, filled with Marxists with RPP sponsorship, was against the nationalists.<sup>7</sup> Additionally, after the Incidents in Malatya (17-19 April 1978), *Devlet* proposed that the organizations that occupied the state (POL-DER and TÖB-DER) had provoked the Alevis against the Sunnis in that city.<sup>8</sup> Seven months before the Kahramanmaraş Incidents, the NAP deputy of Kahramanmaraş, Mehmet Yusuf Özbaş, declared that if anarchy were to emerge in Kahramanmaraş, the only reason would be "a handful of corrupt people and the people who have the garments of state employees that give them this chance."<sup>9</sup>

The criticism of the Justice Party was no different. The leader of the party, Süleyman Demirel, claimed that "Töb-Der, Pol-Der and DİSK were governing the state."<sup>10</sup> According to the vice president of the party, Kemal Doğan, the RPP had not appointed members of the RPP or leftists to important posts, but that people who had been found guilty of being extreme leftist or separatist had been appointed to these positions in Maraş.<sup>11</sup> The mayor of the city (a member of the JP), Ahmet Uncu, declared that all of the state institutions and the police organization were filled with extreme leftists. For Uncu, the state officials, who must be neutral, had provoked the Alevi citizens, who constituted only 10,000 of the total population of 170,000. The body responsible for this was the RPP, "who gives all the initiatives to TÖB-DER, POL-DER and Mehmet Taşkesen's team."<sup>12</sup>

As seen, the most common targets of the rightists within the state apparatus were the teachers and the police. We can begin with the first one, the teachers. As in the rest of Turkey, in Kahramanmaraş, teachers' unionism had begun with the establishment of the Teachers Union of Turkey (*Türkiye Öğretmenler Sendikası-TÖS*). The office of the Governor of Kahramanmaraş reported some supposed secret

activities of forty-nine former TÖS members to the Ministry of National Education on 14 December 1976. According to that report, these teachers were:

- a. supporting the occupation of titled lands,
- b. acting against the Turkish Armed Forces,
- c. provoking Alevi-Sunni animosity
- d. encouraging separatism by changing the oath of the primary school students from "I'm Turkish, I'm righteous" to "I'm Kurdish, I'm righteous",
- e. founding secret associations and even enlisting people under the age of twenty as members of these associations, and
- f. training Turkish children as tools for their ideology by leaving them uneducated.<sup>13</sup>

The paranoid tone of this report and its evaluation by the newspaper *Hergün* (Everyday), an NAP supporter, indicates the strong fear and reaction to the teachers' unionist movement by the rightist front, including the state officials and the political organizations, especially NAP.<sup>14</sup>

The organized movement of the leftist teachers continued with the foundation of TÖB-DER. This union was among the most well organized, best known leftist organizations in Turkey, defining its political platform as progressive, democratic and patriotic. It included all of the radical leftist political groups and also an important part of the teachers who supported Bülent Ecevit's RPP. The pro-Soviet political line, which was mostly represented by the illegal Communist Party of Turkey, controlled the core of the organization.<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, anti-Soviet organizations such as the Maoists and the Enver Hocaists remained with the TÖB-DER insisting on organizing within TÖB-DER since it was the most powerful and effective civil servants organization in Turkey, and because there was no alternative to it.

In the general election held on 5 June 1977, TÖB-DER supported the so-called "democratic forces" against the Nationalist Front parties. For TÖB-DER, the most important thing was preventing the rise of fascism. Its slogan was "5 Haziran'da faşizme geçit yok!" (No passage to fascism on June 5!)<sup>16</sup> While it did not openly support the RPP, the "democratic forces" rhetoric meant no other than the RPP.<sup>17</sup> Thus, the RPP victory was welcomed by TÖB-DER as "a victory of the democratic forces," and it underlined the significance of TÖB-DER's support of the RPP in the victory of the RPP.<sup>18</sup> Additionally, TÖB-DER stated that its members demanded the establishment of a democratic government because there was an immediate need to prevent the establishment of a new Nationalist Front government by "reactionary-fascist forces." For TÖB-DER, the success of the progressive, democratic forces must be concretized by founding a "democratic government" which would be able to hinder fascism supported by comprador-monopoly capital, give breath to progressive forces, develop economic, democratic and political rights and freedoms.<sup>19</sup>

The rise of this association in Kahramanmaraş in accordance with those in the rest of the country in the RPP era turned the strong reactions of the rightist public into a full-fledged political campaign against this association. For example, the discussions between the pro-Soviet factions and the Maoists in the general congress of TÖB-DER were used to prove the union's servitude to external forces. Vice-president of the NAP, Sadi Somuncuoğlu, argued that there were three groups in the TÖB-DER congress: "The supporters of Russia, the pro-Chinese group and the RPP

group allying with a different communist group. There is no group supporting Turkey among these three groups.”<sup>20</sup> He continued that each of them condemned the others as the servants of Russia or China. While none of them denied these condemnations, they insisted on accusing the others of servitude. The national education system as a whole was surrendered to these groups by a governmental decree by Bülent Ecevit.<sup>21</sup>

As seen above, the teachers’ associations were at the heart of the rightist campaign. All teachers were accused of diabolic characteristics such as being leftist, communist, atheist or Alevi. Thus the personal stories of leftist teachers found place in rightist newspapers. In each case, a leftist teacher was described as being the exact opposite of an ideal Muslim, both culturally and politically. In addition, each was considered an important cultural and political actor who could have determined the outcome of the incidents. As an example, the fact that one of the founders of the Workers and Peasants Party of Turkey in Kahramanmaraş city was a teacher was found to be very important by *Hergün*. It was written that if a teacher could legally participate in the foundation of a radical leftist party, there would be many of them in the activities of illegal associations and parties in Kahramanmaraş.<sup>22</sup> Tamer Özdemir, a writer for the right-wing newspaper *Tercüman*, wrote that Aziz Paksu, geography teacher at the Kahramanmaraş Institute of Education, had given religion lessons in the period before the Kahramanmaraş Incidents and had made atheist propaganda in the classroom. Özdemir alleged that Aksu had told his students that "If there is a god, draw a picture of it and we can see what is it like," and then asked them in an examination to prove the existence of God. According to Özdemir, another leftist teacher of the Institute of Education, Hacı Aygün, had shown his gun to his students and said, "Even if you graduate from school, you will not cease to catch the fascists in the villages where you'll go."<sup>23</sup>

Interestingly enough, the event that triggered the Kahramanmaraş Massacre was the assassination of two leftist teachers who were employed at the Kahramanmaraş Vocational High School (Endüstri Meslek Lisesi) Mehmet Yüzbaşıoğlu and Hacı Çolak on 21 December 1978. On the next day, their funeral, organized by TÖB-DER and other leftist organizations, was attacked near Ulu Mosque by 10,000 people. In short, teachers were at the heart of the political warfare in Kahramanmaraş.

The second target was the police. There is obviously a strong positive correlation between the politicization of society and the organizational tendencies of the police. This is mostly related to the fact that unionism within the state's security apparatus is fundamentally different from the establishment of unions (or associations) in other sectors since the state needs the police to suppress the others' movements when necessary. Thus no state regards the unions organizing among its security forces positively and tries to prevent it. In reality, only a strong social (and/or political) mobilization spreading throughout all levels of society could force the people of the security apparatus to organize legally. In these cases, these people working in the security apparatus could accept the extraordinary risks of their activities.

Police unionism in Britain is a good example of this phenomenon. During the Manchester cotton dispute of 1853, the policemen of Manchester organized a strike "for a wage increase for officers and men on grounds of equality with Liverpool."<sup>24</sup> Despite the fact that "there was no march but an 'ostentatiously dignified assembly'

of 170 striking constables," the strike "led to a rapid breakdown of social discipline in Manchester. Blackleg police were attacked and non-striking officers were assaulted."<sup>25</sup> This strike and other actions that followed after led the English state "to see their men as employees, not servants. The police were in fact the first in the public sector to organize a union." In 1918, when a Police Bill outlawing the union came before the Parliament, they tried to organize a nationwide strike. However, the strike "went unsupported by organized labour and was marked by half-cock strikes in London and Birmingham, where there were brutal clashes between pickets and blacklegs, and by mob violence, looting and arson in Liverpool and Birkenhead." Nigel Fielding emphasizes the social and political context of those days for understanding the "meaning" of police unionism: "The context for the Government was one of a likely continuance of the war for a further year, industrial unrest throughout Britain, a police mutiny and effective control of Whitehall, the troops aiding the civil power being young, wounded and sympathetic to the strikers. Lloyd-George conceded the union's demands with a crucial exception. Years later he told a policeman 'this country was nearer to Bolshevism that day than at any time since'"<sup>26</sup>

While police unionism developed in the British context as a follow-up to of trade unionism, some other types of organizations emerged as the representation of the internal conflict within the security forces. The black officer organizations in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s United States are good examples of this type of organizational movement. This movement was the product of the rise of the black movement in the US. In the 1960s, racial discrimination against black people shaped the political agenda of the US. The majority of the black people (especially people from the lower classes) were mobilized throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This mobilization affected the police organization. As Juris and Feuille write, some organizations, "like the New York City Guardians, founded in 1949, evolved from social-fraternal organizations of black policemen into 'racial rights' organizations...Other associations were founded in recent years explicitly to deal with racially based grievances."<sup>27</sup> Local black officer organizations were eventually unified under the National Black Police Association chartered in Chicago in 1972.

Additionally, the black officers' organizational movement produced a reaction among white officers. Juris and Feuille write that "relations between the majority, white dominated unions and the black officer associations were strained. A white interviewee in one city characterized relations between the union and the black association as a 'stand-off- we've got our guns pointed to each other, and each is waiting for the other to make the next move.' White policemen appear to be resentful of the black officer associations because these groups have emerged as the vehicles for institutionalized black protest."<sup>28</sup> In short, the Black Movement in the U.S. in its heyday influenced even the security organization and brought the ongoing political polarization into the center of the organization itself.

In the Turkish experience, the political struggle within the police organization was rooted in a more critical situation. In the 1970s, the struggle within the police organization was part of the ongoing low-intensity civil war environment. As in the American experience, it was based on a popular political issue, but while the American example had an ethnic and cultural element, the Turkish example originated from political-ideological reasons. Of course, police unionism did not have a specific political orientation at the beginning.

To understand the transformation of the police associations, we must remember the history of police associations in Turkey. The first association, the Association of the People from Orta (k) (*Orta (k)lılar Derneği*) was founded in 1970. Its name derived from a course designated to train chief officers in the Police Organization. According to its first regulation, only police chiefs could be members. After some time, the association passed a new regulation providing the other police officers the right to be members. Moreover, the association renamed itself as the *Polis Derneği* (Police Association).<sup>29</sup> In her memoirs, titled *Sakıncalı Kadın Polis* (Unwelcome Woman Police), Nurhan Varlı states that in those years, the Police Association aimed to protect the social rights of the policemen:

We were POL-DER members. My father was, for a while, the president of POL-DER. He was active in the union. We were the first to become members of POL-DER. We did not have any political aims or thoughts for the POL-DER membership since POL-DER was founded to protect the social rights of the police. We became members of POL-DER because of a conviction that our rights could be defended.<sup>30</sup>

The press organ of the union, *Pol-Der*, published many articles underlining POL-DER's existence as a professional organization. In the first volume of *Pol-Der*, D. Birol suggested that POL-DER did not support any political ideology and did not have any aim to challenge the rulers for any reason. All of the activities of POL-DER were meant to achieve better working conditions for police officers.<sup>31</sup> These words indicate that POL-DER initially followed the trade unionist style of police unions in Britain and the U.S.

Furthermore, İsmet Hoşça suggested that their objective was to develop the efficiency mechanism of the state mechanism: “We believe that freedom to unionize does not affect the mechanism of the state negatively. On the contrary this mechanism can work more efficiently and be effective.”<sup>32</sup> For Hoşça, the achievement of such an efficiency would improve the state's ability to govern: “In this way, an unbreakable tie will emerge between the rulers and the ruled.”<sup>33</sup>

Additionally, POL-DER denied the allegations that it was a political organization. Kazım Ulusoy, the president of the POL-DER, underlined the impartiality of POL-DER:

For this reason, our associations' activities and initiatives and our relationship with the rulers must be understood as the signs of social and occupational development. Associations cannot exist in the domain of separatist groups, as some unconscious rulers claim and fear. It is suitable to describe those who claim the opposite and reject the neutrality of the police as defeatists and plotters. Against all understandings and attitudes, I want to declare to the people of the Police Organization: that personal sympathy and personal thoughts and social and occupational orientations are different concepts. Associations aim to reflect the developmental, social, cultural and occupational problems of the people whom they have the right to represent in a legal and objective way. This understanding has always been prevalent and will surely remain the same.<sup>34</sup>

However, contrary to these claims of neutrality, as with the New York City Guardians, POL-DER evolved from a social rights organization into a leftist democratic mass organization. The General Congress of the Police Association, held on 17 May 1975, was a turning point in this process. During the congress, a new administrative council which included well-known policemen who were "labelled" by the rightist press as "communists," was elected. Kazım Ulusoy, İsmet Hoşça, and Sıtkı Öner rejected the rightist organization within the police organization.<sup>35</sup> In the second congress of the POL-DER on 12 June 1976, all of the contradictions came to the surface. A group of people, including police officers and students who wore Grey Wolf and NAP rosettes, came to the congress hall and shouted nationalist slogans. Former Minister of Internal Affairs, Faruk Sükan (Justice Party member), addressed the audience with the following: "Do not hand this association over to the leftists!"<sup>36</sup> However, the existing management was re-elected, with Kazım Ulusoy as president and Sıtkı Öner as secretary general.<sup>37</sup> After that, the rightist police officers resigned from POL-DER and founded POL-BİR (*Polis Birliği Derneği*, the Association of Police Union). Nurhan Varlı sums up the process:

However, after a while, things started to go haywire. Its direction was changed and it took on a political content. This was mostly due to the attitude of the rightist structure within the police organization. After their failed attempt to get hold of the POL-DER, rightist cops founded POL-BİR. Thus the organization, which had been founded to protect the social rights of the police, took on political character.<sup>38</sup>

This transformation took place quite rapidly. Even in the first issues of the journal *Pol-Der*, some opposing claims that were not represented within the state apparatus began to be declared. For example, Kazım Ulusoy spoke on the right not to obey some orders:

In personal or social incidents or in politically motivated incidents, the police must only take the measures ordered by the laws and do the necessary practices. In addition, the police are bound to implement the orders that are seen as necessary by the government. However, this does not necessarily mean obeying all of the orders and behaviours of the political power. In the law system accepted by our constitution, the political power's orders can not be implemented in some cases.<sup>39</sup>

These words, no doubt, targeted the Nationalist Front government between 1975 and 1977. As a leftist employee organization, POL-DER reacted to the government's orders which aimed at suppressing the workers' movement and leftist organizations. Moreover, the members of POL-DER did not want to be a supporter of the *ülküci* forces in the universities.<sup>40</sup> Sıtkı Öner states that POL-DER members did not attack the leftist students' demonstrations. As a result, the leftist students preferred to organize their demonstrations when the police officers of POL-DER were on duty.<sup>41</sup> In sum, if the NF's orders are evaluated as an open war against the left, POL-DER represented police officers who did not want to fight on the side of the right:

When words like “strike,” “boycott,” or “shantytown” are pronounced, “police” comes to mind. For this reason, the political circles that take their power from the upper classes use the police as a legal tool for the benefit of these classes; in other words, they use the people against the people. But it is impossible to imagine the unlawful conduct of the police –the majority of whom have the problem of existence- against his brothers, such as students or workers- who are their neighbours from the shantytowns. In such cases, the upper posts that have the right to direct the police own the fault and the misdeed... We believe that the police must be the protectors of the progressive and emancipating forces rather than those of the reactionary and conservatives and also it must be an institution that has the acceptance and respect of the people.<sup>42</sup>

As mentioned above, after the foundation of the RPP government in early 1978, the rightist political parties began to attack the leftist employee organizations. POL-DER was a major target in this campaign because of the fact that "the revolutionaries could confront the fascists not only in the streets but also in the security apparatus of the state," as Emre Arslan writes.<sup>43</sup>

As opposed to this leftist struggle within the security apparatus, the rightist-nationalist front brought to the agenda the “unfair” practices of the police officers who were members of the POL-DER. For example, on October 16, 1978, *Milli Gazete* (the newspaper of the National Salvation Party) wrote: "300 students who did not enter the classrooms due to the absence of life security and freedom of education at Atatürk High School were beaten and tormented by POL-DER members."<sup>44</sup> Another example came from Batman: "Yesterday police officers who are members of POL-DER took Islamist young people from the coffee house to the police station and tortured them."<sup>45</sup>

Of course, NAP led the major campaign against POL-DER. It carried out the campaign with two main tools, namely by controlling POL-BİR and carrying out a press campaign against POL-DER. Throughout 1978, NAP's newspapers *Hergün* and *Ortadoğu* and its periodicals, such as *Genç Arkadaş* and *Devlet*, gave news about torture practiced by POL-DER members against the nationalist youth. For example, in the first volume of *Devlet*, the headline of an interview with Alparslan Türkeş was "We Will Hold the Torturers Responsible."<sup>46</sup> In the second volume of the same periodical, an interview with the president of POL-BİR, Cemil Ceylan, appeared with allegations against POL-DER:

A pseudo police association called POL-DER unintentionally tells about the unity within the organization. Contrary to this, if we look at their pamphlets and press organs, it is seen easily that it does not have any interest in the police, in the problems of the police, but on the other hand, it does serve an ideology that is prohibited by law; it is the slave of a party and it is destructive and separatist. An organization which commemorates the "martyr of the revolution" in its general congresses, speaks the same with *Bizim Radyo* (Our Radio; radio station of the illegal Communist Party of Turkey) and the Communist Party of Turkey calls the police of the state the police of the people, tries to play with the

dignity of the police, does not have the right to make statements for the police.<sup>47</sup>

On 17 December 1978 (two days before the bombing of Çiçek Cinema), a sentence from Alparslan Türkeş's message to the Kahramanmaraş Congress of the NAP was *Hergün's* headline: "Those Who See the Cries of Tortures as Cries of Happiness Will Render Account of This."<sup>48</sup>

In the context of Kahramanmaraş, the police officers who acted against NAP were condemned as torturers, as will be seen in the case of ETKO Trial. On April 16, 1978, the Police Directorate announced that members of two previously unknown radical nationalist illegal armed organizations, the ETKO (*Esir Türkleri Kurtarma Ordusu*, The Army of the Liberation of Enslaved Turks) and TYK (*Türk Yıldırım Komandoları*, Turkish Lightning Commandos) had been arrested in Kahramanmaraş. The accused were not strangers to the people of Maraş: one of them was Ökkeş Kenger (who became popular eight months later as the first defendant in the Trial of the Kahramanmaraş Social Incidents) and the other, Edip Özbaş (son of the NAP Kahramanmaraş deputy Mehmet Yusuf Özbaş). They were charged with the bombings in Kahramanmaraş, which had been organized to provoke the Alevi and leftist circles and the RPP.<sup>49</sup> The defendants in these trials claimed that the communist police officers had tortured them and organized conspiracies with the aim of condemning them as members of illegal organizations. One defendant in this trial, Şahin Bora, who was fourteen years old at the time, wrote that the president of the Kahramanmaraş POL-DER, Celal Ergün, and some ten officers had plotted conspiracy against him and the other twenty-six *ülkücüs*.<sup>50</sup>

In addition, the members of POL-DER were accused of initiating the violence in the Kahramanmaraş Incidents. *Hergün* condemned POL-DER members: "On the night of December 21-22, the rightist citizens of Kahramanmaraş could not sleep because of fear. Especially, the occupation of Yörük Selim district by the militants gave way to great fears. All through the night, the transportation of weapons and militants to the district continued. In those actions, POL-DER members, in other words Özyaydınlı's police, led and secured the transactions."<sup>51</sup> Moreover, *Hergün* condemned POL-DER members for organizing along with TÖB-DER the funeral of the two leftist teachers on 22 December 1978.

As a result, the Sunni masses attacked the security forces throughout the incidents in Kahramanmaraş. According to the trial indictment (*İddianame*), on 22 December, one of the leaders of the group that attacked the Namık Kemal district, Mirza Doğan, exhorted those around him by shouting, "Shoot the leftists! If the police stop you, shoot the police; if the soldiers stop you, turn and shoot them, too!"<sup>52</sup> That night, about 300 *ülkücüs* held a demonstration, shouting slogans such as "Nationalist Turkey!", "Damn the communists!"<sup>53</sup> These were typical slogans of the fascist movement in the 1970s. In addition to these classic slogans, the demonstrators shouted one that had not been heard before: "Communist police!"<sup>54</sup> This slogan reflected the hostility towards the police and the belief that all that the policemen were doing was protecting the communists. As a consequence, police officers who were allied with the communists and the Alevis were attacked. Police cars were set on fire.<sup>55</sup> On 23 December, an *imam* (prayer leader) standing on an official vehicle of the Technical Department of Kahramanmaraş Municipality,

agitated people with the following words: "My Muslim brothers, do not dread, just hit and destroy! Worthless communist policemen have tortured your children! Muslim Turkey's, Kahramanmaraş's, heroic children, take our revenge on the communists!"<sup>56</sup> On the same day, S. Sığırgüden (one of the defendants from the Mağaralı district) demanded police officer Mehmet Poyraz's gun. When Poyraz refused, Sığırgüden forced him to fire at the Alevis and leftists gathering in the next street. Again Poyraz refused. Then, according to the *İddianame*, Duran Köşk cried "Shoot!" and M. Fuat Şerement, a former policeman<sup>57</sup> said, "I want the head of a policeman; there are no good or bad policemen; shoot!" The police officer was then attacked and seriously wounded.<sup>58</sup> Interestingly enough, the man who had said, "There are no good or bad police" (M. F. Şerement) was protected by the police officers who were members of POL-BİR!<sup>59</sup>

The accusations against the POL-DER members did not stop once the events were over. An aggressive campaign was continued during the investigation and the trial. Hasan Fehmi Güneş became the Minister of Internal Affairs after the resignation of İrfan Özyaydanlı. An investigation committee was founded under the presidency of Kazım Ulusoy, who was also the president of the POL-DER. Ökkeş Kenger criticized Hasan Fehmi Güneş for saying the following to police officers: "If he does not speak like a man, do the necessary things."<sup>60</sup> In addition, Kenger claimed that POL-DER members had tortured him for accepting all of the accusations against him.<sup>61</sup> Hamza Alparslan claims to have collected 227 different letters telling the stories of torture from people arrested in Kahramanmaraş. He states that Hasan Fehmi Güneş, Kazım Ulusoy, Hüseyin Büyükbeyazıt, Korkut Zeybekoğlu, Kamuran Korkmaz, Hüseyin Salmanoğlu and other people were responsible for the torture practiced with the purpose of blaming innocent people.<sup>62</sup>

In the accounts of the incidents, the division of the state organs is not only a cause, but also a factor affecting the direction that the events would take. The interference of the state officers had direct influence on the “fate” of the people since the people organizing the assaults against the Alevis and leftists and the ones who resisted were employees of the same state apparatus that was supposed to act impartially. Some people whose duty was to protect the people under attack were on the offenders' side. An Alevi citizen expressed the following on 17 January 1979:

In the morning at 07:30, the commander of the infantry battalion which came to protect our quarter, Major K. Gündüz, and Captain A. Kamil Bilgutay told us to return to home and they moved the inhabitants of our district into the houses. After that, Captain Kamil made the soldiers get in the car and went to the meet crowd gathering on the slope. He supervised the distribution of the weapons to the crowd.<sup>63</sup>

Nevertheless, some officers were fighting alongside the leftist groups. For example, the director of the *Yol Su Elektrik* (Road Water Electricity), Fevzi Onaç and his colleagues, were condemned for directing the attacks against Pak-Tuz Factory and Eser Bulgur Factory, which were being used by the rightist groups, and shooting at the districts controlled by rightist groups.<sup>64</sup>

More evidence of the participation of the leftist employees came from the Justice Party deputies' demand for the removal of the directors of the Police, PTT, YSE, Forestry, National Education, High Schools, Education Institutes, Technical

High School, and High School of Commerce since “the people see them as the cause and instigator of the incidents.”<sup>65</sup> As mentioned above, the leftist teachers and police officers and other civil servants were the targets of the fascists in the incidents.

If we look at the relationship with the crowd led by the fascists and the army, it is possible to observe a different behaviour towards the army in order to pacify the soldiers who tried to prevent the event. The army was welcomed at the beginning by the crowd with such slogans as, “The Army is with us!” After some time, however, the people declared that the Turkish army could be regarded as “communist” if it did not cooperate with them. When they did not see any cooperation, as seen above in the petition of an Alevi citizen, they cried, “Communist soldier!”<sup>66</sup> Interestingly enough, there was some truth in their slogan. The lower ranking officers were divided along political lines. Erbil Tuşalp sees this division as the only explanation of “why the army waited to make the coup until 12 September 1980. “The right-left division had reached a critical point within the lower ranking officers. If the army is too fast to take over, it is feared that an internal struggle might arise with the participation of the young officers.”<sup>67</sup> Thus, it seems clear that this political cleavage showed itself in the protests against the massacres in Kahramanmaraş. The students of the *Harbiye* (War Academy) spontaneously protested the massacre before watching a movie at the academy; they held a minute of silence for the victims of the massacre and then shouted anti-fascist slogans.<sup>68</sup>

Returning to the political context after the Kahramanmaraş Incidents which was determined by the declaration of martial law, it seems clear that the ongoing political conflict within the state organs did not stop by the martial law. The most dramatic examples of this struggle were seen after the Kahramanmaraş Incidents. As is known, Adana became the scene of political violence in 1979, mostly due to the fact that the trial of the Kahramanmaraş Incidents was held there. Uğur Mumcu wrote the following on 29 September 1979: "Of course, there is a very important reason why the attacks from the rightist terrorists became intense in Adana. The terrorists established their headquarters in this city with their shooting powers since the trial about the Kahramanmaraş Massacre which has political and historical significance is being held in Adana."<sup>69</sup> In that context, many attacks both from the right and left were observed. Chief Commander of the Sixth Army Corps and Commander of the Martial Law in Adana, Kahramanmaraş, Adıyaman, Gaziantep, Hatay and Mersin, Nevzat Bölügiray, described the situation in Adana as a civil war and stated that the declaration of martial law could not stop it. He stated that the police in Adana had taken different sides in the struggles in the streets and each side viewed the other as its enemy. Bölügiray gave some examples about how the police officers communicated with each other:

- Here is the center! An armed conflict is reported in ...Street.
- Teams 315, 320, go to the place where the event is taking place immediately.
- You, fascist dog! How could you become a man and give orders? (..)
- Corrupt communist bastard...<sup>70</sup>

During another event under martial law, police teams were sent out to a district to suppress a battle between leftist and rightist groups. When the authorities

were unable to get news from these teams, the soldiers sent out to the district reported that the policemen were in a quarrel with each other.<sup>71</sup>

The assassination Cevat Yurdakul,<sup>72</sup> the chief of police in Adana, on 28 September 1979, was the climax. On 28 and 29 September, the policemen of Adana quitted working despite orders from the Martial Law Command.<sup>73</sup> They shouted such slogans such as "Down with martial law!" and "Long live the revolutionaries!"<sup>74</sup> In reality, the rules of the martial law were bypassed by 300 leftist police officers of Adana with the cooperation of thousands of people protesting Yurdakul's death.<sup>75</sup>

In sum, the example provided by the Kahramanmaraş Incidents delineates the fact that in times of strong political polarization, the state can become a contested terrain for the ongoing conflict. The Turkish case is no exception. As seen above, all institutions of the state apparatus, including the police and the military, took sides in the conflict throughout the 1970s. The Kahramanmaraş Incidents are significant here since the political polarization turned into a full-fledged civil war in the city between 23-25 December and because these Incidents present clear examples of the issue.

Initially, the radical leftist organizations were strong even within the police organization as seen in the example of POL-DER. Besides, a strong leftist tendency was evident among military students and young officers. These Incidents were not born in a vacuum; since the social and political context made it possible. The rise of social struggles *vis a vis* the radical left affected even the security forces.

Second, the rise of the left from the 1960s and 1970s went hand in hand with the rise of the rightist extremism and fascism. The fascist movement under the leadership of the NAP founded many mass organizations in opposition to the leftists, such as MİSK (*Milliyetçi İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*, Confederation of Nationalist Trade Unions) against DİSK, Ülkü-Bir against TÖB-DER, and POL-BİR against the POL-DER. These organizations, especially the ones that organized within the public sector, became effective anti-communist organizations. Their ongoing challenge of the leftist organizations led them to emphasize their leftist/anti-fascist ideological orientation much more strongly than the times when they organized to improve their members' socio-economic conditions.

Accordingly, the state lost its so-called impartiality and effectiveness. The authorities started to impose strong measures against the organizations, which were believed to be responsible for this situation.<sup>76</sup> However, it was too late. If we grasp the meaning of the examples provided by the Kahramanmaraş Incidents, it is easy to understand the fact that these measures had no chance to yield the expected results. In reality, the Kahramanmaraş Incidents merely rang the opening bell of a larger civil war in which the state employees seemed to take sides in a more direct manner.

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<sup>1</sup>"Maraş'tan sonra...?", *Birikim* no. 46/47, January 1979, p. 56.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 56.

<sup>3</sup> “Memur amirinin değil, bağlandığı politik otoritenin emrini dinlemeye başladı. PTT’de çalışan posta memurundan gümrük ya da polis memuruna, yargıcına kadar böyle işlemeye başladı mekanizma.” *ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>4</sup> Mehmet Ali Birand, Hikmet Bila, Rıdvan Akar, *12 Eylül- Türkiye’nin Miladı*, (İstanbul: Doğan, 1999), p. 101

<sup>5</sup> “Nitekim mevcut hükümet de TÖB-DER’le POL-DER’in dedikodularını ve politikasını rehber edinmiş ve onlara teslim olmuştur.” Mansur Moğol, *Milli Gazete*, 6 October 1978.

<sup>6</sup> *Milli Gazete*, 12 October 1978.

<sup>7</sup> *Devlet* no. 6, (September 1978), p.7.

<sup>8</sup> *Devlet* no. 1, (April-May 1978), p. 4.

<sup>9</sup> “Kahramanmaraş’ta ne yapılmak isteniyor?” *Hergün*, 2 May 1978.

<sup>10</sup> “TÖB-DER, POL,DER ve DİSK devleti yönetiyor.” *Devlet*, no. 9, p. 22, 23.

<sup>11</sup> Hamza Alparslan, “Kahramanmaraş 1978-1980,” *Hergün*, 29 August 1980.

<sup>12</sup> “Bütün ipleri TÖB-DER’e, POL-DER’e ve Mehmet Taşkesen’in ekibine..” “Kahramanmaraş Olayları nedir, ne değildir?” *Tercüman*, 1 January 1979.

<sup>13</sup> “a) Halkın tapulu arazilerini işgal ettirmek, toprak yürüyüşünü desteklemek b) Türk silahlı kuvvetleri aleyhinde bulunmak c) Alevi-Sünni ayrımı yapmak d) İlkokul öğrencilerine ‘Türküm, doğruyum’ yerine ‘Kürdüm, doğruyum’ şeklinde ant söyleterek bölücülük yapmak d) Gizli dernekler kurmak ve 20 yaşından küçük olanları bile bu derneklere almak e) Türk çocuklarını bilgisiz yetiştirmek suretiyle kendi ideolojilerine daha kolay alet edilir hale getirmek.” Hamza Alparslan, “Kahramanmaraş 1978-1980,” *Hergün*, 28 August 1980.

<sup>14</sup> More evidence for the hostility against the TÖS came from NAP supporter *Töre Devlet* Publications. A book published by it proposed that the TÖS was an illegal Marxist-Leninist organization. In addition, the book accused the TÖS of cooperating with the communists who organized with Mahir Çayan’s group. Moreover, it claimed that the ones who abducted an airplane to liberate Deniz Gezmiş were TÖS members. *TÖS Dosyası-2* (Ankara: Töre Devlet Yayınevi, 1973), p. 31.

<sup>15</sup> These words make clear the pro-Soviet line of TÖB-DER: “The same tendency is strengthening in our country like an avalanche in spite of all plots of the capital, all prohibitions, suppressions, 12 Marches, tortures, exiles. What kind of development is this? Of course, it is a healthy and organized development that stems from the economic and democratic demands of the great masses and it is against the lines that were not seen as being in the ‘left’ by us such as counter-revolutionist Maoism firstly; also gauchism, anarchism and Trotskyism.” “*Aynı eğilim ülkemizde de sermayenin tüm tuzaklarına rağmen, tüm yasaklara ve baskılara, 12 Mart’lara, işkencelere, kıyımlara, sürgünlere*

*rağmen bir çığ gibi büyümektedir. Nasıl bir büyüme bu? Artık kesinlikle 'sol' içinde görmediğimiz, karşı devrimci çizgideki maoculuk başta olmak üzere, goşizme, anarşizme, troçkizme...karşı.” “5 Haziran'da faşizme geçit yok!” TÖB-DER-Tüm Öğretmenler Birleşme ve Dayanışma Derneği Konya Şubesi Yayın Organı, 27 May 1977, no. 1, p. 4. In addition, TÖB-DER states demands such as “splitting from NATO and CENTO and offensive blocks, cleaning our land from foreign military bases, forming a democratic and progressive system and building a government that takes side with the people.” “NATO'dan, SENTO'dan, saldırganlık bloklarından çıkmak, topraklarımızı yabancı üslerden temizlemek, ülkemizde demokratik, ilerici bir dozen, halktan yana bir hükümet kurmak.” ibid. This rhetoric is in line with the Communist Party of Turkey. Also it used the concepts like ‘peaceful coexistence’, which is only used by the pro-Soviet parties throughout the world. ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> “The probabilities for working with the social democrats who have leftist lines strengthening within themselves is getting better” “Aralarında sol akımların belirginleştiği sosyal demokratlarla çalışma koşulları da iyileşiyor.” Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> “Teachers who are members of TÖB-DER, who fight undauntedly to overthrow the public enemy MC (Milliyetçi Cephe-Nationalist Front-BG) and replace it with a democratic government, have a significant share in this victory.” “İstemlerimiz,” TÖB-DER-Tüm Öğretmenler Birleşme ve Dayanışma Derneği Konya Şubesi Yayın Organı, 15 June 1977.

<sup>19</sup> “Seçimi Demokratik Güçler Kazandı Demokratik Bir İktidar Mutlaka Kurulmalıdır!” TÖB-DER-Tüm Öğretmenler Birleşme ve Dayanışma Derneği Konya Şubesi Yayın Organı, 15 June 1977.

<sup>20</sup> “Rusya yanlıları, Çin yanlısı grup, bir başka komünist grupla ittifak yapan CHP grubu. Bu üç grup arasında Türkiye yanlısı olan grup yoktur.” Devlet no. 7, (October 1978), p. 22.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>22</sup> “Öğretmenler parti kurucusu olarak görev alıyorlardı,” Hergün, 21 January 1979.

<sup>23</sup> “Eğer varsa Allah'ın resmini çizim de görelim nasılmış,” “Mezun olsanız bile gideceğiniz köylerde faşistlerin yakasını bırakmayacaksınız.” Tamer Özdemir, “Kahramanmaraş'ta kanayan yara,” Tercüman, 13 January 1979.

<sup>24</sup> Nigel Fielding, *The Police and Social Conflict-Rhetoric and Reality* (London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: The Athlone Press, 1991), p. 62.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>27</sup> Hervey A. Juris, Peter Feuille, *Police Unionism*, (Massachusetts: Lexington, 1973), p. 165.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 173.

<sup>29</sup> Sıtkı Öner, *Halkın Polisi, Pol-Der Anıları*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003), p. 34.

<sup>30</sup> “Bizler POL-DER’liydik. Babam POL-DER’de bir dönem başkanlık da yaptı. Dernekte faaldı. Bizler POL-DER’e ilk üye olanlardandık. POL-DER’e üye olmakla herhangi bir siyasal amaç ve düşüncemiz yoktu. Çünkü POL-DER polis memurlarının sosyal haklarını koruyup kollamak amacıyla kurulmuştu. Biz de bir polis olarak haklarımızın savunulacağı, sahip çıkılacağı düşüncesiyle POL-DER’e üye olmuştuk.” Çetin Yiğenoğlu (ed) *Sakıncalı Kadın Polis Nurhan Varlı'nın Anıları* (İstanbul: Çağdaş, 1995), p. 41.

<sup>31</sup> D. Birol, “Kıvançlıyız,” *Pol-Der* no. 1, (October 1975).

<sup>32</sup> “Sendikal özgürlüğün sanılacağı gibi Devlet mekanizmasını işverimi açısından olumsuz yönde etkilemeyeceği, aksine bu mekanizmanın daha verimli çalışacağı ve etkin olacağı inancındayız.” İsmet Hoşça, “Özgürlükler Üzerine,” *Pol-Der* no. 1, (October 1975).

<sup>33</sup> “Böylelikle yönetenler ile yönetilenler arasında sağlam ve sarsılmaz bir bağ teşekkül edecek..” *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>34</sup> “Bu nedenle, derneklerimizin faaliyet ve girişimleri ile, yöneticilerle kurulan ilişkilerimiz toplumsal ve mesleki gelişimin işaretleri olarak benimsenmelidir. Bilinçsiz yöneticilerin korktuğu ve vasıflandırdığı gibi, dernekler bölücü cereyanların etkisi ve güdümünde olamaz. Bunun aksini savunanları ve polisin tarafsızlığını Kabul etmeyenleri bozguncu ve bölücü olarak işaretlemek yerinde olur. Tüm anlayış ve tutumlara karşı Emniyet Teşkilatı bireyelerine duyurmak isterim: Kişisel sempati ve kişisel görüş ile, toplum ve mesleki yönelim ayrı ayrı kavramlardır. Dernekler, temsil yetkisini aldıkları kişilerin kalkınma, sosyal, kültürel ve mesleki sorunlarını kanuni ve objektif olarak yansıtmakla görevlidirler. Bu anlayış her zaman böyle olmuş, böyle devam edecektir.” Kazım Ulusoy, “Polisde Dernekler,” *Pol-Der* no. 1, (October 1975).

<sup>35</sup> The association decided to take the name POL-DER during this congress. "POL-DER" is the abbreviation of "Police Association." (Sitki Öner, "Emniyet Örgütü ve POL-DER", *Pol-Der* no. (5, 6, 7). After 1975, all the people including the ones who do not know its real name called it as “POL-DER.”

<sup>36</sup> Öner, *Halkın Polisi*, p. 42, 43.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43, 44.

<sup>38</sup> “Ancak sonradan olay çarpıtıldı. Yönü değişti, siyasi içerik kazandı. Bu da polis teşkilatı içindeki sağ yapılanmanın tutumu yüzünden oldu. Sağcı polisler POL-DER’i ele geçiremeyince POL-BİR’i kurdular. Böylece polisin safça sosyal haklarının korunup kollanması amacıyla kurulan örgütler siyasi nitelik kazandı.” Yiğenoğlu, p. 41.

<sup>39</sup> “Bu bakımdan bireysel veya toplumsal adli olaylarda, siyasal amaçlı olaylarda, polis yalnızca yasaların emrettiği tedbirleri almalı ve işlemleri yapmalıdır. Bu arada hükümetin gerekli gördüğü tedbirleri yerine getirmekle de yükümlüdür. Bu, görevlilerin siyasal iktidarın her türlü emir ve davranışlarına karşı boyun eğmeleri gerektiği anlamına gelmemelidir. Anayasamızın Kabul ettiği hukuk düzeni içerisinde siyasal iktidarın emirlerini de yerine getirmeyebilir.” Kazım Ulusoy, “Emniyet Görevlilerinin Siyasal Tarafsızlığı,” *Pol-Der* no. 3, (December 1975).

<sup>40</sup> In the third issue of *Pol-Der*, one of Örsan Öymen’s (a columnist of *Milliyet* newspaper) articles took part. In this article, Öymen announced that the *ülküçü* was supported by the policemen in a fight against leftist students. Örsan Öymen, “Polis” *Pol-Der* (3), December 1975. For another example, see “Komandolar bir polisi dövdü,” *Pol-Der*, no. (5,6,7).

<sup>41</sup> Öner, *Halkın Polisi*, p. 83.

<sup>42</sup> “Bir grev, boykot veya gecekondü sözü geçince, akla hemen ‘polis’ gelir olmuştur. Çünkü, egemen sınıflara sırtını dayamış olan politik çevreler, polisi, bu sınıfın yararına ‘yasal maşa’ gibi, daha genel bir ifade ile, halkı halka karşı kullanagelmişlerdir. Oysa çoğunluğu yaşam ve geçim sıkıntısı içerisinde olan polisin, kardeşleri olan öğrencilerimize ve gecekondü komşusu olan işçilerimize yasa dışı davranışlarını düşünmek bile olanaksızdır. Bu tür tutumlarda kusur ve suç, polise yön verme yetkisi olan üst makamlardır... Siyasal iktidar olduğunda partilerin, polisi kendinden gösterme ve kılma çabası, bu örgüt üzerinde hiç de iyi etkiler yaratmamaktadır. Yansızlık ve layıklık çizgisi üzerinde görev yapmak durumunda olan güvenlik örgütünün, komandolar ve imamhatiplerin aralarına alınmak istendiğinde göstermiş olduğu tepki, bunun en açık örneğidir... Bu örneği vermektan amaç, polis örgütünün, faşizan bir baskı kurmak eğiliminde olanlarla, sömürü düzeninin devamını isteyenlere ne kadar itibar edeceğini göstermek içindir... Polisin her ülkede gerici ve tutucu değil, ilerici ve özgürlükçü güçlerin koruyucusu ve halkın da benimseyip saygı duyduğu bir kuruluş olması gereğine inanıyor..” Gürbüz Atabek (ex-chief of police of İzmir), “Halkın Polisi Olmak,” *Pol-Der* no. 3, (December 1975).

<sup>43</sup> Emre Arslan, “Faşizmin Siyaseti:MHP'nin iktidar bloğu karşısında değişen strateji ve konumları,” *Praksis*, no. 5, (2002), p. 310.

<sup>44</sup> “Atatürk Lisesi’nde can emniyeti ve okuma hürriyeti bulunmaması sebebiyle derslere girmeyen 300 öğrenci, POL-DER’li polisler tarafından coplanmış, tartaklanmıştır.” “Elazığ Atatürk Lisesi’nde can güvenliği kalmadı,” *Milli Gazete*, 16 October 1978.

<sup>45</sup> “Geçtiğimiz gün POL-DER’li polisler kahvede bulunan islamcı gençlerden bazılarını karakola götürerek işkence yapmışlardır.” “Batman’da Pol-Der’liler kahve basıyor,” *Milli Gazete*, 28 October 1978.

<sup>46</sup> “İşkencecilerden hesap soracağız”(A talk with Türkeş), *Devlet* no. 1, (April-May 1978), p. 16, 17.

<sup>47</sup> “POL-DER isimli sözde polis derneği de poliste birlikte beraberlikten ağzının kenarı ile bahsediyor. Fakat bildirilerine, yayın organlarına bakıldığında aslında polisle, polislikle uzaktan ve yakından alakasının olmadığı kanunlarla yasaklanan bir ideolojinin uşaklığını yaptığı, siyasi parti kölesi olduğu, yıkıcı, bölücü olduğu açıkça görülür. Şehit polisler dururken genel kurullarında “Devrim Şehitleri” adına saygı duruşunda duran Bizim Radyo ve Türkiye Komünist Partisinin ağzıyla demeçler veren, Devletin polisine Halkın polisi diyen, polisin haysiyeti ve şerefi ile oynamaya çalışan bir kuruluş polis adına demeç vermeye yetkili değildir.” “Polis Devletin Polisidir” (interview with the president of the POL-BİR, Cemil Ceylan), *Devlet* no. 2, (July 1978), p. 17.

<sup>48</sup> “İşkence çığlıklarını ‘mutluluk feryadı’ görenler hesap verecek,” *Hergün*, 17 December 1978.

<sup>49</sup> The petition of the advocates Ali Kalan, Emcet Olcaytu and Barış Yiğit to “Adana-Kahramanmaraş-Gaziantep ve Adıyaman İlleri Sıkıyönetim Komutanlığı Askeri Mahkemesi Kıdemli Hakimliği” file number:1979/401, p. 5.

<sup>50</sup> Türkmenoğlu, “Kahramanmaraş’tan Kanlı Maraş’a,” *Hergün*, 20 January 1979.

<sup>51</sup> “21-22 Aralık gecesi, Kahramanmaraş’ta sağ görüşlü yurttaşlar sabaha kadar korkudan uyuymadılar. Özellikle Yörük Selim Mahallesi’nde her tarafın militanlar tarafından işgal ettirilmesi büyük endişelere yol açtı. Gece boyunca da bu mahalleye silah ve cephane nakli ile adam biriktirme eylemi devam etti. Bu eylemlerde POL-DER üyesi, diğer deyimle Özaydınlı’nın polisleri başı çektiler ve nakil işlemlerinde adeta güvenliği sağladılar.” Alparslan, “Kahramanmaraş 1978-1980- 6”, *Hergün*, 2 September 1980.

<sup>52</sup> *İddianame*, p. 142.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> “Müslüman kardeşlerim, durmayın vurun kırın. Allahsız komünist polisler çocuklarınıza işkence ettiler. Kahramanmaraş’ın kahraman çocukları, acımızı komünistlere komayın.” Suat Parlar, *Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Gizli Devlet* (İstanbul: Spartaküs, 1996), p. 355.

<sup>57</sup> Advocate Hayri Balta's petition of reply to “Ankara 10. Asliye Mahkemesi,” file number: 1995/529, p. 25.

<sup>58</sup> *İddianame*, p. 150.

<sup>59</sup> “Polisin iyisi kötüsü olmaz, vurun!” *ibid.*, p. 107.

<sup>60</sup> “Adam gibi konuşmazsa gerekeni yapın.” Alparslan, “Kahramanmaraş 1978-1980,” *Hergün*, 7 September 1980.

<sup>61</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> Alparslan, “Kahramanmaraş 1978-1980,” *Hergün*, 7 September 1980. Ökkeş Kenger underlines the Alevi identity of a policeman: “An Alevi police, Hüseyin Salmanoğlu-from Köprübaşı Village in Pazarcık county who works in the Police Organization tortured me. That man annihilated me.” *ibid.*

<sup>63</sup> “Sabah saat 07:30’da mahallemizi korumak için gelen piyade taburunun başındaki binbaşı Kemal Gündüz ve Yüzbaşı A. Kemal Bilgutay bize ‘Siz içeri girin, sizing emniyetiniz sağlanmıştır’ diyerek biz mahalle sakinlerini evlerimize tıkadıktan sonar, Yüzbaşı Kamil askeri arabaya binerek yamaç dağda toplanmış kalabalığın yanına gidip kalabalığın yanındaki sivil araçtan indirilen askeri malzemelerin dağıtılmasına nezaret etti.” Şahhüseyinoğlu, p. 142.

<sup>64</sup> *Iddianame*, p. 141.

<sup>65</sup> Selim Yalçiner, “Maraş’ın Dört Günü-3,” *Cumhuriyet*, 30 December 1978.

<sup>66</sup> Şahhüseynoğlu, p. 133.

<sup>67</sup> Erbil Tuşalp, *Eylül İmparatorluğu*, (Ankara: Bilgi, 1988), p. 36.

<sup>68</sup> *ibid.*, p. 38.

<sup>69</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 29 September 1979, quoted by Nevzat Bölügiray, *Sokaktaki Asker. Bir Sıkıyönetim Komutanının 12 Eylül Öncesi Anıları*, (Milliyet Yayınları, 1989), p. 117.

<sup>70</sup> “Burası merkez, .. Mahallesi’nde silahlı çatışma çıkmış. 315, 320. ekipler derhal mahalleye gidin. – Sen faşist kopek, ne zaman adam oldun da emir veriyorsun? – Satılmış komünist piçi!” Bölügiray, p. 34, 35.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.

<sup>72</sup> Yurdakul was a POL-DER member. As Sıtkı Öner states, Cevat Yurdakul's term was the best in POL-DER's organization. He captured more than 50 armed activists, including the idealists and leftists. On 31 August 1979, NAP Gaziantep deputy Cengiz Gökçek and Sivas Deputy Ali Gürbüz declared that Cevat Yurdakul sided with the leftists. They declared, “If Yurdakul resigns or escapes abroad; he can not escape from our hands.” Öner, p. 117.

<sup>73</sup> Bölügiray, p. 103; Öner, p. 118.

<sup>74</sup> Bölügiray, p. 103.

<sup>75</sup> A radical leftist periodical reported the events: “This assassination was responded to with disgust and hatred. Patriotic policemen from POL-DER resisted by quitting their jobs. The anger of the masses grew. As a response to that situation, proletarian revolutionaries and patriotic revolutionaries organized a demonstration to transform the anger into an anti-fascist struggle. They supported the resistance of the policemen who gathered for a funeral ceremony.” “*Bu cinayet şehirde kin ve nefretle karşılandı. POL-DER’li yurtsever polisler işi bırakarak direnişe geçtiler. Kitlenin öfkesi kabardı. Bu durum üzerine proleter devrimciler ve yurtsever devrimciler kitlelerin bu tepkisini anti-faşist bir mücadeleye dönüştürmek için bir gösteri düzenlediler. Cenaze töreni için..toplanan direnişçi polislerin direnişini desteklediler.*” *Devrimci Halkın Birliği*, 19 October 1979.

<sup>76</sup> The Martial Law Command of Ankara closed four police associations including the POL-DER and POL-BİR on 26 January 1979. *Cumhuriyet*, 27 January 1979. It is comparable with the Police Act of Britain, which was accepted in 1919. “The Act set up the Police Advisory Council and the Police Federation. The latter was expressly forbidden to join the TUC. It was illegal for police to join any union having the object of influencing pay, pensions or conditions of any force...It is an offence if a

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policeman calls or attends any unauthorized meeting about matters concerning the force.” Fielding, p. 66.